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Abstract: ‘Thought insertion’ in schizophrenia involves somehow 
experiencing one’s own thoughts as someone else’s. Some philos-
ophers try to make sense of this by distinguishing between ownership 
and agency: one still experiences oneself as the owner of an inserted 
thought but attributes it to another agency. In this paper, we propose 
that thought insertion involves experiencing thought contents as alien, 
rather than episodes of thinking. To make our case, we compare 
thought insertion to certain experiences of ‘verbal hallucination’ and 
show that they amount to different descriptions of the same phenom-
enon: a quasi-perceptual experience of thought content. We add that 
the agency/ownership distinction is unhelpful here. What requires 
explanation is not why a person experiences a type of intentional state 
without the usual sense of agency, but why she experiences herself as 
the agent of one type of intentional state rather than another. We con-
clude by sketching an account of how this might happen. 
1. Introduction 
First-person reports of ‘thought insertion’ in schizophrenia (hereafter 
TI) suggest that it is possible to experience one’s own thoughts as 
emanating from someone else. On one interpretation, TI involves an 
error of identification: you recognize the thought but fail to recognize 
it as your own. If this is right, it overturns the assumption that you can 
be ‘wrong about which psychological state you are in’ but not about 
‘whose psychological state it is’ (Campbell, 1999, p. 609). In phenom-
enological terms, it challenges the view that, if you experience 
psychological state x, then you experience x as yours. A compre-
hensive explanation of TI needs to include an account of (a) what a TI 
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experience consists of and (b) how TI is generated, where (a) is con-
cerned solely with clarifying the relevant phenomenology, while (b) 
also addresses non-conscious or ‘subpersonal’ mechanisms. In this 
paper, we focus upon (a), but there are also implications for (b). 
Suppose TI is taken to be an experience of type x when it is in fact an 
experience of type y, and that an account is then offered of x-
generating mechanisms, where x-generating mechanisms are not 
involved in generating y. Such an account would not merely be false 
but also irrelevant. Hence it is crucial to get the phenomenology 
broadly right, and that is what we seek to do here. 
One way to make sense of TI without accepting that it involves a 
radical error of identification is to distinguish between our experiences 
of ‘subjectivity’ and ‘agency’ (Stephens and Graham, 2000), or 
‘ownership’ and ‘agency’ (Gallagher, 2005). We experience ourselves 
as the owners of our thoughts; they arise within the boundaries of our 
subjectivity. We also experience ourselves as the agents of our 
thoughts; we think them. The ‘inserted thought’ is experienced as 
produced by another agency, one that uses one’s own mind as a 
medium to think. So one owns the thought but is not the agent behind 
it.1 In what follows, we will argue that this distinction does not illumi-
nate the nature of TI (although we do not seek to reject the distinction 
outright; it may well be informative in other contexts), and we will 
offer an account of the phenomenology of TI that does not appeal to 
retention of ownership and loss of agency. 
We begin by suggesting that the standard illustrations of TI are 
ambiguous, in failing to distinguish alien thought contents from alien 
acts or episodes of thinking. This ambiguity is then carried through to 
philosophical accounts of TI. We then argue that TI involves experi-
encing thought contents as somehow alien, rather than episodes of 
thinking. Our approach is to show that TI experiences are no different 
from certain ‘verbal hallucinations’. Both involve an unfamiliar way 
of experiencing content p that lies somewhere between ‘having the 
thought that p’ and ‘perceiving that p’. One’s experience of p is 
perception-like, in that p appears non-self-produced. But it also 
remains thought-like, in that p continues to resemble thought content 
                                                          
1  This move defuses an apparent contradiction: ‘it is my thought, but it is not my 
thought.’ The first ‘my’ is the ‘my’ of ownership (the thought occurs within my psycho-
logical boundaries) and the second ‘my’ is the ‘my’ of agency (the thought is not of my 
doing). 
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more so than sensory perceptual content. Hence it might be described 
in terms of a perception with an unusual content or a thought that one 
has not produced. 
We go on to argue that the agency/ownership distinction fails to 
illuminate the nature of TI. It is not a matter of experiencing ‘state y 
without agency’ rather than ‘state y with agency’. What requires 
explanation is why p is experienced as the content of an unfamiliar 
type of intentional state, x, rather than a familiar type of intentional 
state, y. Then we offer a tentative phenomenological account of how 
this could happen in at least some cases: anxious anticipation of one’s 
own thought contents as they form leads to an experience of them as 
alien and strange. We conclude by noting that TI therefore involves a 
profound change in one’s experience of self and world. The sense of 
being a coherent locus of experience and agency, distinct from one’s 
surroundings, is inseparable from the capacity to experience per-
ceiving that p and thinking that p as distinct. That capacity is, to 
varying degrees, compromised in TI. 
2. Verbal Hallucinations and Inserted Thoughts 
The philosophical literature on TI is over-reliant on a few choice 
examples, which frequently serve as the principal or sole basis for 
discussion. Here are the two most popular ones: 
I look out of the window and I think that the garden looks nice and the 
grass looks cool, but the thoughts of Eamonn Andrews come into my 
mind. There are no other thoughts there, only his… He treats my mind 
like a screen and flashes his thoughts into it like you flash a picture. 
(Mellor, 1970, p. 17) 
Thoughts are put into my mind like ‘Kill God.’ It’s just like my mind 
working, but it isn’t. They come from this chap, Chris. They are his 
thoughts. (Frith, 1992, p. 66) 
Both are ambiguous in failing to distinguish encountering the content 
of a thought as alien from encountering an act of thinking as alien. Of 
course, the phenomenology of ‘thinking’ is heterogeneous. For 
instance, thinking is active and effortful to varying degrees. However, 
although it is unclear what exactly the various experiences of thinking 
consist of, we suggest that a general distinction can be drawn between 
acts or episodes of thinking and the thought contents that are 
generated through them. Hence it can be asked: is Chris’s thinking 
experienced as going on in one’s own ‘mind’ or, alternatively, the 
thought contents that his thinking produces? Is Eamonn Andrews 
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‘flashing’ his thought processes onto a screen or just the contents of 
his thoughts? This lack of clarity remains in many philosophical 
accounts of TI. For example, Stephens and Graham (2000, p. 4) state 
that ‘[in TI] the experience of thinking is not “I think” but “Someone 
else is putting their thoughts in my head”’. Does one experience the 
thoughts as having been put in one’s head, and thus as originating 
elsewhere? Alternatively does one experience the act of their being 
‘put there’, which would be more akin to experiencing someone else’s 
thinking?2 
We propose that TI involves experiencing thought contents as alien, 
rather than thinking. B is not mistaken about whether she is the owner 
and/or the agent of her thinking. What happens is that she experiences 
p as the content of an unfamiliar, quasi-perceptual experience, rather 
than one of thinking that p. The experience is perception-like, in so far 
as B experiences something as present (rather than as remembered, 
anticipated, or imagined) and as emanating from elsewhere. However, 
it remains thought-like, in so far as the content of the experience con-
tinues to resemble that of an act of thinking. This interpretation has 
the advantage of rendering the phenomenon more tractable, given that 
such mistakes are perhaps not so unfamiliar. On one interpretation of 
dreaming, we take ourselves to perceive or believe that p when we 
actually dream or imagine that p. And we often lack insight into the 
nature of our emotions: we take ourselves to be happy for someone 
when we resent their achievements, or we fail to recognize how upset 
we are about something. Occasionally, we might take ourselves to 
remember something when we actually imagine it, or feel uncertain 
about whether we are remembering or imagining it. Nevertheless, our 
account of TI does not render it mundane or detract from its philo-
sophical interest. As will be made clear in the concluding section, TI 
— as we have characterized it — involves a profound disruption of 
self-experience, of a kind that is not limited to the sense of agency. 
Why adopt the content-interpretation? There is no evidence in the TI 
literature for the view that it concerns thinking rather than thought 
contents; stock examples are compatible with both interpretations. 
Furthermore, there is a positive case to be made for our view. To 
                                                          
2  However, Graham (2004, p. 96) states more clearly that TI concerns the ‘phenomen-
ology of thinking’. See also Roessler (2013, p. 661) for the observation that discussions 
of TI often fail to differentiate the content of an ‘episode of thinking’ from the thought 
produced. 
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make that case, we turn to verbal hallucinations (hereafter, VHs).3 
According to orthodox conceptions, an hallucination is a perceptual 
experience that arises in the absence of appropriate external stimuli 
(e.g. Frith, 1992, p. 68). Thus, if the ‘act of thinking’ interpretation of 
TI is adopted, VHs turn out to be very different from TI: VH involves 
experiencing p in the absence of p, while TI involves thinking that p 
but experiencing one’s thinking as someone else’s. In one case, there 
is an anomalous experiential content. In the other, one’s own inten-
tionality is misattributed to someone else. So, while VH involves a 
familiar kind of experience (albeit a non-veridical one), TI involves an 
experience that is intrinsically anomalous and strange — a thought 
process that one does not think. Given this difference, it is puzzling 
that many authors attempt to account for them both in the same way, 
often by appealing to the agency/ownership distinction (e.g. Stephens 
and Graham, 2000; Gallagher, 2005). 
The content view has the virtue of dissolving this tension. It is 
sometimes suggested that VH and TI are actually different 
descriptions of the same phenomenon (e.g. Langland-Hassan, 2008, p. 
373). The content view makes clear how this could be so. If TI 
involves experiencing thought contents as (a) present and (b) 
emanating from elsewhere, then it shares these characteristics with 
perceptual experiences. Hence it might equally be described in terms 
of a perception with an unfamiliar content. Conversely, if VH content 
is not perceived to originate in a localized external source and does 
not have the full range of auditory characteristics, it could equally be 
described in terms of experiencing an alien thought. 
So far, this is rather speculative. We have argued that (a) TI could 
involve thought content rather than episodes of thinking; (b) this 
would bring it closer to various familiar phenomena and thus make it 
easier to understand; and (c) the content view also accommodates the 
alleged similarity or even identity between VH and TI. But is there 
any evidence for the view? In order to address that question, we first 
need to constrain the scope of our enquiry to certain kinds of VH. VHs 
are heterogeneous; variables include number of voices, degree of 
personification, the content of what is said, mode of address (second- 
or third-person), and presence or absence of auditory qualities (Nayani 
                                                          
3  The more usual term is ‘auditory verbal hallucination’ (AVH). We use the term ‘verbal 
hallucination’ (VH) instead, as not all ‘voice hearing’ experiences are genuinely 
auditory, and it is the non-auditory ones that we focus upon here. 
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and David, 1996; Larøi, 2006; McCarthy-Jones et al., 2014). Some-
times, VHs are said to be auditory and external. For example, Leudar 
et al. (1997, p. 888) describe them as ‘verbal and with phenomenal 
properties like hearing another person speaking, but in the absence of 
anyone who could have produced it’; Garrett and Silva (2003, p. 445) 
similarly state that ‘the subjective quality of sensation is a near-
universal feature of auditory hallucinations’; and Wu (2012, p. 90) 
premises his model on the fact that VHs ‘sound like voices’. However, 
others describe them as predominantly internal and lacking in auditory 
properties. Stephens and Graham (2000) argue at length that most 
‘voice-hearers’ do not actually hear voices at all; Frith (1992, p. 73) 
maintains that a VH can involve something more abstract than hearing 
a voice, ‘an experience of receiving a communication without any 
sensory component’; and Moritz and Larøi (2008, p. 104) suggest that 
the term ‘voice-hearing’ may well be a ‘misnomer’, an ‘inaccurate 
term to express that their cognitions are not their own’. 
In fact, it seems clear that VHs come in both guises. David (1994) 
states that most but not all subjects experience voices as arising 
‘inside the head’, while Nayani and David (1996) report that 49% of 
their subjects heard voices through their ears, 38% internally, and 12% 
in both ways. Leudar et al. (1997, p. 889) state that 71% of their sub-
jects heard only internal voices, 18% heard voices ‘through their ears’, 
and 11% heard both. Some or all external VHs might well have 
properties much like those of veridical auditory perceptions, but 
internal VHs do not. Although they are not always described as wholly 
bereft of auditory properties, first-person accounts suggest that they 
are quite different from those VHs that are experienced as audition-
like and as originating in externally located events. This is readily 
apparent when we scrutinize the testimonies of individuals who 
experience both kinds, where the two are explicitly contrasted: 
‘I feel like I have other people’s thoughts in my head and also hear 
other people having conversations outside my head.’(#3) 
‘They are inside my head. I do sometimes hear voices that are 
indistinguishable, but it’s shorter and much less frequent.’ (#15) 
‘There are two kinds — one indistinguishable from actual voices or 
noises (I hear them like physical noises), and only the point of origin 
(for voices) or checking with other people who are present (for sounds) 
lets me know when they aren’t actually real. The second is like hearing 
someone else’s voice in my head, generally saying something that 
doesn’t “sound” like my own thoughts or interior monologue.’ (#17) 
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‘The voice is inside my head at times appears to come from within my 
brain. But at other times, specifically when my name is called, it seems 
that it comes from outside, almost like someone is trying to catch my 
attention.’ (#27) 
Neither ‘internal’ nor ‘external’ VHs are exclusive to schizophrenia 
diagnoses. The above quotations (and all other numbered quotations in 
this paper) were obtained via a questionnaire study on ‘voices and 
voice-like experiences’, and respondents listed several different diag-
noses. So, while we aim to say something about the nature of TI and 
VH experiences, we remain non-committal about (a) the reliability of 
diagnostic categories such as ‘schizophrenia’ and (b) whether certain 
kinds of experience are specific to certain diagnostic categories.4 
Some internal VHs are described as having no auditory qualities at 
all.5 Hence we might wonder whether their sensory qualities differ in 
any way from those of some or all thought contents. If they do not, 
then what we would have is a perception-like experience of thought 
content, an unfamiliar kind of experience that could equally be 
communicated in either of two ways: 
 I experience content p as a thought content that I did not think. 
 I experience content p as a perceptual content, but one that is 
anomalous in lacking certain properties. 
And this, we suggest, is exactly what happens. Internal VHs are not 
experiences of a familiar kind that are regarded as strange only 
because they are non-veridical. Like TI, they are intrinsically strange. 
They involve an unfamiliar kind of ‘perception-like’ intentional state, 
a view that is supported by the observation that people frequently 
struggle to convey them.6 They are often said to be ‘almost like’ 
                                                          
4  Quotations were obtained via a 2013 internet questionnaire study, which we conducted 
with several colleagues as part of the Wellcome Trust funded project ‘Hearing the 
Voice’. The study received ethical approval from the Durham University Philosophy 
Department Research Committee. Participants were asked to provide free text responses 
to several questions about voices and voice-like experiences. Study design was closely 
based on earlier work addressing the phenomenology of depression (for details, see 
Ratcliffe, 2015). All respondents quoted in this paper had psychiatric diagnoses: schizo-
phrenia (#8, #32); schizoaffective disorder (#33); borderline personality disorder (#1, 
#3, #4); dissociative identity disorder (#2, #5); post-traumatic stress disorder (#22); 
psychosis (unspecified) (#7, #15); bipolar disorder (#17); major depression (#18, #27). 
5  This is consistent with reports of ‘voices’ in congenitally deaf subjects (e.g. Aleman and 
Larøi, 2008, pp. 48–9). 
6  See also Langland-Hassan (2008, p. 373) for the view that VHs are difficult to describe, 
given that they do not fit into familiar psychological categories. 
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something — it is ‘as though’ something were the case. For instance, 
they are sometimes described as ‘like’ telepathy: 
‘The commentary and the violent voices I heard as though someone was 
talking to me inside my brain, but not my own thoughts. Almost like 
how telepathy would sound if it were real. I don’t know how else to 
explain it.’ (#4) 
‘…there are things I “hear” that aren’t as much like truly hearing a 
voice or voices. […] Instead, these are more like telepathy or hearing 
without hearing exactly, but knowing that content has been exchanged 
and feeling that happen.’ (#7) 
‘Telepathic conversations between me and most other people.’ (#8) 
‘The best way to describe it is telepathy, in different grades of vivid-
ness, from bearable to intrusive.’ (#33) 
It might be objected that what we have said conflicts with the observa-
tion that even internal VHs are usually reported in terms of audition, 
rather than other kinds of perceptual experience. However, informa-
tion of the relevant kind is usually received via auditory channels, at 
least in the absence of visual stimuli such as reading materials. So, 
even when it is bereft of the usual sensory qualities, it lends itself to 
description in those terms. Furthermore, talk of hearing and sounds is 
often qualified, and auditory terms may appear in scare quotes (as in 
quotation #7 above). In fact, an internal VH that lacked auditory pro-
perties could equally be compared to an experience of reading, but in 
the absence of any perceived text. As one questionnaire respondent 
remarks: ‘When you read a book, you hear it in the voice of the author 
or the narrator, but you know that voice isn’t yours. It’s a lot like that’ 
(#5). Importantly, internal VHs can also be described in terms of TI. 
That this is the case is made clear by first-person reports that straddle 
TI and VH, referring to the same phenomenon both as a voice and as 
an alien thought: 
‘The voice inside my head sounds nothing like a real person talking to 
me, but rather like another person’s thoughts in my head.’ (#1) 
‘The voices inside my head are like thoughts, only they are not my 
own…’ (#2) 
‘…it definitely sounds like it is from inside my head. It’s at some kind 
of border between thinking and hearing.’ (#18) 
Of course, phenomenology cannot simply be read off first-person 
reports. Such reports are often vague and amenable to a range of inter-
pretations. So we have not offered a conclusive case. Nevertheless, the 
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interchangeability of TI and VH descriptions constitutes evidence in 
support of the thought content view; people do describe the same 
experience in terms of perceiving that p and experiencing the thought 
that p as alien. Furthermore, our account makes sense of such reports, 
by postulating an unfamiliar kind of experience that falls somewhere 
in between thinking and perceiving. Hence, in the absence of con-
flicting evidence in support of the thought process view, the content 
view is to be preferred. 
It is plausible to suggest that some internal VHs do have auditory or 
audition-like properties, and thus further lend themselves to 
description in terms of ‘hearing voices’. However, this need not con-
flict with our claim that they are TI under another description. The 
view that thought is sometimes or always wholly bereft of auditory 
properties is far from uncontroversial.7 Most approaches to VHs take 
them to involve misattributed ‘inner speech’ rather than simply 
‘thought’, where inner speech is only one form that our thoughts can 
take. And Hoffman (1986), amongst others, maintains that inner 
speech incorporates ‘auditory imagery’. We should add that, in 
suggesting that internal VHs resemble perceptions, we do not wish to 
imply an exclusive resemblance to sensory perceptions of the external 
environment. They are experienced as falling within one’s bodily 
boundaries and — in this respect — more closely resemble intero-
ception or proprioception. However, as meaningful communications 
are ordinarily received through external sensory channels, internal 
VHs differ from bodily experiences as well. This further emphasizes 
the point that TI/VH involves an unusual kind of experience, some-
thing that is not quite like thinking, externally directed perception, or 
perception of one’s bodily states. 
The more general phenomenon sometimes referred to as ‘double 
bookkeeping’ serves as further evidence for our view that TI/VH 
involves an unfamiliar kind of intentional state. Many who express 
delusional beliefs and describe hallucinatory experiences also speak 
and act in ways that distinguish their delusions from other beliefs, and 
their ‘hallucinations’ from veridical perceptions (Sass, 1994, p. 3). 
                                                          
7  See, for example, Prinz (2011) for the stronger claim that conscious cognitive episodes 
never lack sensory qualities. This is one of various views adopted in the context of the 
current ‘cognitive phenomenology debate’. See Bayne and Montague (2011) for a good 
anthology on this. 
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Consider this passage from Autobiography of a Schizophrenic Girl, 
where the author, ‘Renee’, describes the cries in her head: 
I did not hear them as I heard real cries uttered by real people. The 
noises, localized on the right side, drove me to stop up my ears. But I 
readily distinguished them from the noises of reality. I heard them 
without hearing them, and recognized that they arose within me. 
(Sechehaye, 1970, p. 59) 
Descriptions like this again suggest a kind of experience that does not 
fit neatly into established intentional state categories. Indeed, J.H. van 
den Berg (1982, p. 105) observes how ‘voices’ are often given a 
‘special name’ to set them apart from perceptual experiences, due to 
their having a ‘recognizable character of their own which 
distinguishes them from perception and also from imagination’. This 
would also explain why the majority of clinical and non-clinical 
‘voice-hearers’ are readily able to distinguish their ‘voices’ from 
veridical auditory perceptions (Moritz and Larøi, 2008). 
3. Distinguishing Types of Intentional State 
The position we have defended complements an approach to delusions 
proposed by Currie (2000) and Currie and Jureidini (2001), according 
to which a delusion is not a recalcitrant false belief but an imagining 
that is mistaken for a belief. In the case of VH/TI, there is similarly 
confusion between two kinds of intentional state: perceiving and 
thinking. Currie and Jureidini (2001) construe this as an epistemic 
problem: one actually imagines that p but mistakes one’s imagining 
that p for the belief that p. However, they later reject a categorical 
distinction between imagination and belief, allowing for the possi-
bility of intentional states that fall between the two (Currie and 
Jureidini, 2004). 
Whether our account is to be construed in epistemic or constitutive 
terms depends on which definitions of ‘perception’ and ‘thought’ are 
adopted. It could be maintained that perception — by definition — 
involves receipt of information from an external source, whereas 
thinking does not. Perception is to be defined in terms of its success 
conditions: one perceives that p only where the experience of p is 
produced by an external source in an appropriate way. So an 
hallucination — in the orthodox sense of the term — is not a per-
ception but an experience that resembles a perception. And the same 
applies to TI/VH. Alternatively, we could appeal to perception-
specific neurobiological processes. An hallucination would qualify as 
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a perception if those same processes were involved in its production. 
But TI/VH would not, assuming it involved processes associated with 
thinking rather than perceiving. If it involved a combination of the 
two, there might be no fact of the matter. Another option is to adopt a 
wholly phenomenological conception of perception and thought: if 
one is in a phenomenological state that is like believing or perceiving, 
then one is ipso facto in a state of that kind (e.g. Horgan and Tienson, 
2002).8 Hence TI/VH would not involve mistaken identity but a 
blurring of the distinction between thinking and perceiving, a type of 
intentionality that is neither one nor the other. 
For current purposes, we do not wish to insist on any particular 
definition of perception. Our claim is that, whether or not ‘perceiving 
or thinking that p’ is to be identified with ‘experiencing oneself as 
perceiving or thinking that p’, what we have in the case of TI/VH is 
‘an experience of being in a certain kind of intentional state’, which 
differs in character from mundane experiences of thinking that p or 
perceiving that p.9 Hence, regardless of how perception is defined, it is 
clear that TI/VH departs from the orthodox conception of hallucina-
tion. In phenomenological terms, orthodox hallucination involves a 
perceptual experience of p (or an experience that closely resembles 
one of perception in a given sensory modality), but in the absence of 
p. Although certain VH experiences may take this form, those that are 
also describable in TI terms involve an intrinsically strange, quasi-
perceptual experience of something that otherwise resembles thought 
content. 
One might also wonder how our account relates to the widespread 
view that TI is a ‘delusion’. It cannot simply be the case that VH is an 
‘hallucination’ and TI a ‘delusion’, given that they can amount to 
different descriptions of a common phenomenon. The ‘voice hearer’ 
may or may not take her experience of VH/TI to be veridical. It feels 
as if the content comes from elsewhere, and whether or not this either 
constitutes or gives rise to a delusion depends on whether or not the 
                                                          
8  As Horgan and Tienson (2002, pp. 522–3) put it: ‘In addition [to the phenomenology of 
intentional content], there is also a specific what-it’s-likeness that goes with the attitude 
type as such. There is a phenomenological difference between wondering whether 
rabbits have tails on one hand and thinking that rabbits have tails on the other. This 
aspect is the phenomenology of attitude type.’ 
9  Garrett and Silva (2003, p. 453) also suggest that VHs involve ‘a new category of 
experience that blends elements of perception and thought but remains distinct from 
both’. However, they emphasize the sensory qualities of VHs in a way that we do not. 
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subject accepts that it comes from elsewhere. It is debatable whether a 
sense of the content’s coming from a personal source is intrinsic to the 
experience or whether it involves the embellishment of a core experi-
ence. However, the latter is plausible, given that VHs are personified 
to varying degrees (Bell, 2013). And, as noted by Hoerl (2001, p. 
189), patients ‘seem much more unequivocal that the thoughts in 
question do not belong to them than they are about possible ways in 
which others might be implicated in their occurrence’. A high degree 
of personification may also be linked to delusion-formation, in so far 
as it involves an increasingly elaborate attempt to make sense of the 
experience in terms of another agent, who may have specific 
characteristics and intentions. In addition, it is likely that the 
description ‘TI’ lends itself to a delusional interpretation more so than 
that of ‘hearing a voice’. Saying that one ‘hears a voice’ serves to 
express an anomalous experience but does not operate as an explana-
tion of it (unless one further insists that the experience is a veridical 
one). However, TI includes more specific reference to causes. Hence 
it is less likely to be used as a non-committal description of an experi-
ence, and also more likely to operate as an explanation: I have the 
anomalous experience because B is inserting thoughts in my head. 
That said, the same delusion could equally be construed in terms of 
other people ‘really speaking in my head’, and a TI description does 
not imply endorsement of a TI explanation. So the distinction between 
an internal VH and a ‘delusion of TI’ is not a clear one, and the under-
lying experience can be the same in both cases. 
4. Agency and Ownership Revisited 
Given the account we have sketched, we do not find the agency/ 
ownership distinction helpful in this context. That distinction could be 
applied to an intentional state, its content, or both: I am the agent 
and/or owner of intentional state x and/or its content p. In one sense, 
experienced ownership of an intentional state implies ownership of its 
content. In short, if I experience myself as perceiving, then I experi-
ence myself as having a perception of something. And, if I experience 
myself as thinking, I experience myself as having a thought with some 
content. Even in the case of TI, one takes oneself to be having an 
experience with some content. What is anomalous is not that the con-
tent ‘fails to belong to me’ but that it is experienced as non-self-
generated, when contents of that kind usually are self-generated. How-
ever, there is another sense in which one does not experience oneself 
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as the ‘owner’ of p. As Bortolotti and Broome (2009, p. 208) ask, do 
you really ‘own’ something that you feel so ‘radically alienated’ 
from? The answer to this question is that you do not experience your-
self as owning the inserted thought any more than you experience 
yourself as owning a chair as you look at it (where ‘ownership’ is 
understood in terms of something’s falling within one’s psychological 
boundaries). What you do own, though, is an experience of that 
thought content, an experience of its originating from elsewhere. By 
analogy, when you hear someone say ‘I hate you’, you have an experi-
ence that includes the content ‘I hate you’, a content that you might be 
said to ‘own’. But, just as the experience of a chair can be 
distinguished from the chair itself, experience of the utterance can be 
distinguished from the utterance. In both cases, there is a sense that 
what one experiences is non-self-produced. This is all that talk of con-
tinued ownership expresses: one has an experience of p, but an experi-
ence of p’s originating in an external source. ‘I still own p’ is just 
another way of saying ‘I am not the agent that produced p’. It there-
fore adds nothing to the view that TI involves lack of experienced 
agency.10 
Should we say, then, that TI involves experiencing content p with 
no associated sense of agency, resulting in a perception-like experi-
ence? That’s not really helpful either. It can be maintained that per-
ception, like thought, involves a sense of agency. Perception is not a 
wholly passive process. We actively look, we listen, we interact with 
our surroundings, and we physically manipulate objects in order to 
reveal their hidden features. As various enactivist approaches to 
perception have emphasized, perception is a matter of exploratory 
activity rather than the passive receipt of information (e.g. Noë, 2004). 
And one need not endorse one or another enactivist position in order 
to accept the less committal view that perceptual experience involves 
varying degree of agency, rather than passive receipt of sensory 
                                                          
10  See also Sousa and Swiney (2013, p. 644) for a ‘deflationary’ account of ‘ownership’ 
along these same lines. Talk of ‘ownership’, they note, can have all sorts of different 
connotations. In the context of TI, it is just another way of saying that one is not the 
agent of the thought. ‘The patient is simply emphasizing via the language of thought 
ownership that she does not have the sense of being the producer (“source”) of the 
thoughts.’ See Gallagher (in press) for a response to several criticisms of the agency/ 
ownership distinction and for further clarification of his own view. His various 
responses and refinements do not — so far as we can see — pose a challenge to our 
own concerns about the agency/ownership distinction as applied to TI, although they do 
amount to a plausible case for its more general applicability. 
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information. It should of course be added that we do not experience 
ourselves as wholly responsible for the contents of our perceptions. 
Whatever theory of perception one might adopt, it seems fair to say 
that we experience the contents of our perceptions as largely deter-
mined by things that are external to ourselves. So perceptual experi-
ence might involve some sense of agency, but we don’t attribute our 
perceptual contents to our own agency. Whether or not one sees a 
table or a window depends on where one turns one’s head, but it is the 
presence of a table that determines whether one sees a table when one 
does turn one’s head in a given direction. Thought contents, unlike 
perceptual contents, are not experienced as environmentally dependent 
in this way. 
However, it is unclear what the relevant experience of agency is 
supposed to consist of. One might struggle to think through a 
philosophical problem and, in so doing, experience a coherent stream 
of thought as self-generated and effortful. However, the song that 
suddenly, unexpectedly, and effortlessly pops into one’s head is quite 
different, as are occasional and uncomfortable thoughts that do not 
cohere with one’s own values, such as ‘why not punch him on the 
nose to see how he reacts?’. Such thoughts can arise unannounced and 
even be surprising, but this does not prevent their being experienced 
unproblematically as episodes of thought. So the experience of 
‘having the thought that p’ is not a singular one, and encompasses 
various cases that seem to involve little or no awareness of agency. 
Hence it is not clear that the phenomenological difference between 
having the thought that p and having an experience of p as non-self-
produced can be attributed to the presence or absence of a sense of 
agency. All we have so far is the following: 
 When one experiences oneself as the agent of mental state type 
x, the content of x is experienced as self-produced. 
 When one experiences oneself as the agent of mental state y, the 
content of y is experienced as non-self-produced. 
Why, then, is the content of thought ordinarily experienced as self-
produced while the content of perception is not? The answer might 
seem simple enough: non-self-produced contents have certain pro-
perties that distinguish them from self-produced contents. For 
example, a voice that emanates from somewhere else has a perceived 
location and various distinctively auditory characteristics. But one of 
the most interesting things about TI/VH is that it challenges such a 
view. The phenomenological difference between thinking that p and 
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perceiving that p cannot be wholly attributed to different contents, 
given that TI involves something that retains the properties of thought 
content but at the same time seems to come from elsewhere. So what 
we need to account for is this: 
 One experiences a content of the kind ordinarily associated with 
a state of type x, but in such a way that it is experienced as non-
self-produced. In virtue of the content’s seeming to be non-self-
produced, the experience resembles a state of type y, even though 
its content differs from those ordinarily associated with y. 
We will now sketch a tentative account of how such an experience 
might arise, an account that does not appeal to the sense of agency. 
5. Reformulating the Question 
We have suggested that the question to ask is not ‘why is there a sense 
of ownership but no sense of agency for an intentional state of a given 
type?’ but, rather, ‘why is there an erosion of the phenomenological 
distinction between two intentional state types?’. As already noted, we 
doubt that appeals to conscious agency will assist in distinguishing 
quasi-perceptual experiences of thought content from seemingly 
passive but quite unproblematic ‘episodes’ of thought. But one could 
instead appeal to a breakdown of non-conscious processes. Even when 
a thought seems to come unannounced, that thought (and — to some 
degree — its content) might still be anticipated in a non-conscious 
way. It is when such anticipatory processes break down that the 
thought is experienced in an anomalous way. 
That said, we should not be too hasty in ruling out a role for con-
scious anticipation. Even if we do not experience a sense of effort, 
agency, or intention in relation to all thought contents, perhaps they 
are at least anticipated. So it could be that the phenomenological 
difference between TI and thinking is that the content of TI arises 
without any conscious anticipation and is therefore more like per-
ceptual content. However, there are two problems with that view. First 
of all, perceptual contents are not always unanticipated. Indeed, it has 
been argued that perceptual experience is riddled with anticipation, as 
exemplified by moments of surprise when things do not appear as 
anticipated but where anticipation did not involve consciously enter-
taining a propositional attitude with the content ‘x is behind the door’ 
or ‘y has property p and not property q’ (Husserl, 1948/1973; Noë, 
2004; Ratcliffe, 2008; 2015; Madary, 2013). Furthermore, what we 
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perceive is often partly attributable to our own activities, which we 
expect to have certain, often quite specific, effects. If I hurl a glass at a 
wall, it comes as no surprise to me when it makes a loud crash and 
shatters into pieces. The second problem is that many ‘voice hearers’ 
do anticipate when they will ‘hear’ a voice, and they also anticipate, 
to varying degrees, what they will ‘hear’. Some report being able to 
communicate with their ‘voices’ (e.g. Garrett and Silva, 2003, p. 449), 
and 38% of the subjects who participated in a study by Nayani and 
David (1996, p. 183) reported being able to initiate a voice. This also 
poses problems for the view that VH/TI is to be accounted for in terms 
of non-conscious prediction mechanisms. It could well be that some 
such mechanism fails. Even so, where there is conscious anticipation, 
some kind of non-conscious prediction mechanism is surely at work 
too. 
Another consideration to keep in mind is the content-specificity of 
many TI/VH experiences. Where a non-conscious mechanism breaks 
down, it might do so only sporadically, but this does not account for 
the fact that many TI/VH experiences have consistent thematic con-
tents. More often than not, the contents of ‘voices’ are insults and 
simple terms of abuse, an observation that applies to several different 
psychiatric diagnoses and also to some of the VH experiences reported 
in non-clinical populations (Nayani and David, 1996; Leudar et al., 
1997; Aleman and Larøi, 2008). Given this, it is unsurprising that VHs 
are often associated with heightened anxiety (Allen et al., 2005; 
Kuipers et al., 2006; Paulik, Badcock and Maybery, 2006). What is of 
particular interest to us, though, is the observation that generalized 
social anxiety often precedes the onset of VHs and that anxiety may 
be especially pronounced immediately before the onset of a voice. It 
has therefore been suggested that anxiety acts as a trigger (Freeman 
and Garety, 2003, p. 923). 
We will now briefly sketch an account of how anxiety might 
generate the kind of experience described here. (A more detailed 
account is offered in Ratcliffe and Wilkinson, in preparation.) We do 
not wish to insist that this account applies to every case of TI/VH; 
such experiences could well arise in a number of different ways. 
Rather, our claim is that on the basis of (a) our account of VH/TI, and 
(b) available empirical evidence, there is a plausible hypothesis that 
applies to at least a subset of cases. Our proposal is that VH/TI is not a 
matter of lacking anticipation, conscious or otherwise, but of antici-
pating the arrival of thought contents in a distinctive way. It is about 
how one anticipates. Anxiety, we suggest, alienates a person from the 
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object of anxiety: when one is anxious about p, one experiences p as 
something that impedes one’s agency — something that one may seek 
to avoid but feel helpless in the face of. By implication, p is experi-
enced as distinct from oneself. It need not be experienced as physi-
cally external. Serious illness can involve losing an implicit ‘trust’ in 
the body’s ability to perform its various functions and, along with this, 
a curious sense of estrangement from one’s body (Carel, 2013). With 
this, bodily experiences may themselves be objects of anxiety; they 
are experienced as impinging upon the self, threatening the self. We 
can also feel anxious about our own abilities to perform various tasks. 
However, we are seldom anxious about our own thought contents. 
When we are anxious about the prospect of messing up something 
important, we are anxious about a state of affairs that may or may not 
arise, not about ‘the thought that a state of affairs might arise’. 
But suppose that you became anxious about the arrival of thoughts 
with contents such as ‘you are a worthless piece of filth and everyone 
is laughing at you’. It might be objected that you cannot feel anxious 
about a thought with the content p before you have that thought; the 
thought must have formed already. However, thought contents do not 
always form instantaneously. Often, there is a short period during 
which they coalesce and their content becomes more determinate. 
Take the experience of realizing that you have forgotten something 
important. It can start with an inchoate sense of anxiety which might 
be expressed by the indeterminate content ‘something is wrong’, 
followed by ‘I’ve forgotten something’ and, finally, ‘I’ve not brought 
my passport to the airport’, after which the repercussions of this 
omission increasingly sink in. 
That thoughts take shape in some such way is also consistent with 
the commonplace assumption that VHs involves misidentified ‘inner 
speech’, as distinct from thought more generally, where inner speech 
is a form that only some thoughts take on. As Stephens and Graham 
(2000, p. 82) remark, talking to oneself is one ‘way of thinking’. This 
suggests a process whereby thought contents become inner speech 
contents (Hoffman, 1986; Fernyhough, 2004). We can add that, when 
a thought takes on an explicitly linguistic form (which is not to imply 
that thought more generally is bereft of linguistic structure), its con-
tent gains greater determinacy. This view gains further plausibility 
from the observation that many VH/TI contents are emotionally 
charged. In fact, they might be regarded as more determinate linguistic 
expressions of emotional attitudes towards oneself, involving feelings 
of shame, worthlessness, and social estrangement. The person might 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
18
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
  THOUGHT  INSERTION  CLARIFIED 263 
resist such emotional states, try to avoid them, and thus feel a sense of 
dread as they coalesce into a more determinate linguistic judgment.11 
So, one way in which a VH/TI experience could occur is that the 
person anxiously anticipates the arrival of thought content p as it 
coalesces. Given that anxiety alienates, p is then experienced as some-
thing she confronts, something that threatens, which she feels helpless 
in the face of. This sense of alienation from p amounts to a perception-
like experience of it: p is the object of an emotional experience that is 
not ordinarily associated with thought contents, an experience that is 
more usually associated with what we encounter through external 
sensory perception or through interoception. By analogy, consider the 
experience of reading a letter with a consistently abusive and insulting 
content. What would such an experience be like if the text were absent 
and if one could not avoid the content by averting one’s gaze? One 
would dread what is coming next, feel increasingly alienated from it, 
and yet continue to anticipate it.12 Certain first-person reports indicate 
something much like this: 
‘It’s very difficult to describe the experience. Words seem to come into 
my mind from another source than through my own conscious effort. I 
find myself straining sometimes to make out the word or words, and my 
own anxiety about what I hear or may have heard makes it a fearful 
experience. I seem pulled into the experience and fear itself may shape 
some of the words I hear.’ (#32) 
If something along these lines is right, then the difference between TI 
and more mundane experiences of thinking is not that TI involves a 
lack of something (for example, a sense of agency). Rather, a certain 
affectively charged way of anticipating is present in TI. Hence it may 
not be that some positive characteristic is required in order to identify 
thought content as self-generated. Perhaps it does not require any 
                                                          
11  Colombetti (2009) suggests that expression and, more specifically, linguistic expression 
serves to individuate or even partly constitute certain emotions, a point that may apply 
to inner speech as much as to overt linguistic expression. 
12  Billon (2013, p. 16) similarly offers an analogy between TI and being perceptually pre-
sented with a sentence, but offers an account according to which inserted thoughts, 
unlike thoughts more generally, are not ‘phenomenally conscious’. Hence TI involves 
having a conscious experience of something that is not itself part of one’s consciousness 
and thus appears alien to it. We similarly maintain that TI involves experiencing one’s 
thoughts in a perception-like way, but we do not attribute this to a lack of ‘first-order 
phenomenology’. Rather, it is a matter of taking oneself to be in intentional state x, 
rather than y, something that can be accounted for without appealing to the distinction 
between phenomenally conscious and unconscious thoughts. 
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anticipation at all, conscious or otherwise. Many thoughts could well 
be just what they seem to be, unanticipated and quite mundane — the 
song that starts in one’s head, the irrelevant thought that disrupts one’s 
concentration while writing. Self-attribution could be the default way 
of experiencing thought contents. It takes an anomalous mode of 
anticipation, such as anxious anticipation, to transform an episode of 
thought into a quasi-perceptual encounter with something.13 
What we are proposing is, in one respect, consistent with accounts 
that appeal to lack of endorsement; a thought appears alien when — 
for whatever reason — one fails to endorse its content (Stephens and 
Graham, 2000; Bortolotti and Broome, 2009). The difference is that, 
according to our account, lack of endorsement does not follow forma-
tion of thought content. Rather, one seeks to avoid the content as it 
arises but feels helpless before it. One might say that the experience is 
one of ineffectively resisting the arrival of a negative emotional judg-
ment regarding oneself: 
‘…it’s mocking me, I hate that one […] I am left in a state of fear […] 
They don’t sound like me. They are angry most of the time. I don’t like 
to think of mean things, I try hard not to, but the more I try not to think 
the more the voices get nasty.’ (#22) 
It can be added that this generally occurs in the context of a more 
general susceptibility to blurring of the phenomenological boundaries 
between intentional state types. Subjects with a range of different 
psychiatric diagnoses report pervasive feelings of anxiety and 
estrangement, which would render one more vulnerable to TI in those 
cases where thought contents are especially troubling. There may also 
be more specific phenomenological changes associated with the pro-
dromal stages of schizophrenia, which can involve thoughts in general 
being experienced as more perception-like, thus weakening the 
phenomenological boundaries between intentional state types in a way 
that increases vulnerability to more pronounced, content-specific 
disturbances (e.g. Raballo and Larøi, 2011). 
This type of account could be extended from the thinking/perceiving 
distinction to intentional states more generally. For instance, the 
alienating role of anxiety could apply equally to the anticipation of 
                                                          
13  Our account thus differs from that of Gallagher (2005), who suggests that anxiety may 
explain why thoughts appear alien but suggests that anxiety disrupts anticipation such 
that thoughts arrive unannounced and fully formed, rather than coalescing in a way that 
is consistent with what was anticipated. 
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distressing memories and imaginings, both of which may have more 
pronounced auditory qualities. Indeed, Michie et al. (2005) propose 
that VHs involve memory intrusions, rather than misplaced inner 
speech, although McCarthy-Jones et al. (2014) report that only 39% of 
their subjects acknowledged VH contents resembling memories and 
even fewer said that their VH contents were memories. It could well 
be that internal VHs are heterogeneous, involving experiences of inner 
speech, memories, and imaginings, as well as some contents that 
blend memories with imaginings. And the predominance of one form 
or another may reflect individual differences, different life histories, 
and different diagnostic categories. To speculate, we might find a pre-
dominance of alienated memory contents in cases where there is past 
trauma. However, inner speech VHs with less pronounced auditory 
phenomenology may be more often associated with schizophrenia 
diagnoses, thus accounting for more frequent reports of TI in 
schizophrenia.14 
6. Conclusion 
It might seem that we have offered a rather deflationary view of TI. 
One does not experience an episode of thinking while failing to 
identify oneself as the agent. Rather, one experiences p as the content 
of an unfamiliar type of intentional state. Although still puzzling, this 
is closer to more familiar experiences where we take ourselves to be in 
state x in relation to p when we are actually in state y. However, what 
we in fact end up with is a version of the view that TI involves an 
erosion of ego boundaries, an experienced blurring of the distinction 
between self and non-self (see, for example, Hoerl, 2001, for a 
                                                          
14  As noted earlier, other ‘subtypes’ of VH are not captured by our account, including 
many that more closely resemble veridical auditory experiences in character. However, 
certain kinds of ‘external VH’ can also be understood in terms of social anxiety, thus 
accounting for why internal and external VHs often occur together. Dodgson and 
Gordon (2009, p. 326) observe that anxiety and hyper-vigilance generate false positives, 
especially in ‘noisy’ environments where stimuli are susceptible to multiple interpreta-
tions. This, they suggest, accounts for a ‘substantial subset of externally located voices’. 
This is also consistent with the ‘neural diathesis-stress’ model of schizophrenia (Walker 
and Diforio, 1997), especially a more recent version of it that places the emphasis on 
responses to situations involving an ‘uncontrollable, social-evaluative threat’ (Jones and 
Fernyhough, 2007, p. 1174). If something along these lines is right, the phenomenology 
and underlying mechanisms in the internal and external cases would be quite different, 
but they could be attributable to a common underlying cause — pronounced and 
pervasive social anxiety. 
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discussion of that view). It is not that one fails to distinguish self from 
non-self by experiencing a state of type x while failing to self-attribute 
it. Rather, one lacks an ability to distinguish type x from type y, where 
the distinction between them is partly constitutive of the self/non-self 
distinction. 
Suppose one were completely unable to distinguish perceiving that 
p from entertaining the thought that p or remembering that p, and that 
this applied to all cases of p. One would lack any sense of the 
distinction between one’s own consciousness and things external to it. 
More specifically, if the distinction between thinking that p and 
receiving the communication that p from someone else were lacking, 
one would not be able to distinguish one’s own thought contents from 
those of others. The ‘I think’ would be gone from experience. Now, TI 
does not involve anything quite so extreme. Even so, to have frequent 
experiences that do not respect the phenomenological distinctions 
between types of intentional state (distinctions that the self/other/ 
world distinction depends upon for its intelligibility) would challenge 
— to varying degrees — the sense of being a singular subject of 
experience, distinct from the surrounding world and from other sub-
jects. This would be exacerbated by a less extreme but more pervasive 
erosion of the experienced distinctions between intentional state types. 
Consider the following first-person account, by someone with a 
schizophrenia diagnosis: 
…the real ‘me’ is not here any more. I am disconnected, disintegrated, 
diminished. Everything I experience is through a dense fog, created by 
my own mind, yet it also resides outside my mind. I feel that my real 
self has left me, seeping through the fog toward a separate reality, 
which engulfs and dissolves this self. (Kean, 2009, p. 1034)15 
Talk of disintegration and diminishment, and of things being experi-
enced as self-created and at the same time ‘outside’, can be plausibly 
interpreted in terms of the erosion of phenomenological differences 
between familiar intentional state categories. Without those 
distinctions, one is no longer a ‘real self’, situated in a world that is 
not of one’s own making. The sense of being a coherent locus of 
experience and agency, distinct from what it experiences, is thus com-
promised and the self is ‘diminished’. Hence TI does, after all, point 
to a profound disturbance of first-person experience. 
                                                          
15  Sass (e.g. 1992; 1994) describes such experiences in great detail, in a way that is con-
sistent with much of what we have proposed. 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
18
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
  THOUGHT  INSERTION  CLARIFIED 267 
Acknowledgments 
We are grateful to the Wellcome Trust for funding the research that 
led to this paper (grant number WT098455). We would also like to 
thank Shaun Gallagher, audiences at the Universities of Durham and 
Warwick, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and 
suggestions. 
References 
Aleman, A. & Larøi, F. (2008) Hallucinations: The Science of Idiosyncratic Per-
ception, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Allen, P., Freeman, D., McGuire, P., Garety, P, Kuipers, E., Fowler, D., 
Bebbington, P., Green, C., Dunn, G. &d Ray, K. (2005) The prediction of 
hallucinatory predisposition in non-clinical individuals: Examining the contri-
bution of emotion and reasoning, British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 44, pp. 
127–132. 
Bayne, T. & Montague, M. (eds.) (2011) Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Bell, V. (2013) A community of one: Social cognition and auditory verbal 
hallucinations, PLOS Biology, 11 (12), pp. 1–4. 
Billon, A. (2013) Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought 
insertion, Philosophical Psychology, 26, pp. 291–314. 
Bortolotti, L. & Broome, M. (2009) A role for ownership and authorship in the 
analysis of thought insertion, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 8, pp. 
205–224. 
Campbell, J. (1999) Schizophrenia, the space of reasons, and thinking as a motor 
process, The Monist, 82, pp. 609–625. 
Carel, H. (2013) Bodily doubt, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 20 (7–8), pp. 
178–197. 
Colombetti, G. (2009) What language does to feelings, Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 16 (9), pp. 4–26. 
Currie, G. (2000) Imagination, delusion and hallucinations, in Coltheart, M. & 
Davies, M. (eds.) Pathologies of Belief, pp. 167–182, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Currie, G. & Jureidini, J. (2001) Delusion, rationality, empathy: Commentary on 
Davies et al., Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 8, pp. 159–162. 
Currie, G. & Jureidini, J. (2004) Narrative and coherence, Mind & Language, 19, 
pp. 409–427. 
David, A.S. (1994) The neuropsychological origin of auditory hallucinations, in 
David, A.S. & Cutting. J.C. (eds.) The Neuropsychology of Schizophrenia, pp. 
269–313, Hove: Psychology Press. 
Dodgson, G. & Gordon, S. (2009) Avoiding false negatives: Are some auditory 
hallucinations an evolved design flaw?, Behavoural and Cognitive Psycho-
therapy, 37, pp. 325–334. 
Fernyhough, C. (2004) Alien voices and inner dialogue: Towards a developmental 
account of auditory verbal hallucinations, New Ideas in Psychology, 22, pp. 49–
68. 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
18
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
 268 M.  RATCLIFFE  &  S.  WILKINSON 
Freeman, D. & Garety, A. (2003) Connecting neurosis and psychosis: The direct 
influence of emotion on delusions and hallucinations, Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 41, pp. 923–947. 
Frith, C. (1992) The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Schizophrenia, Hove: Psychol-
ogy Press. 
Gallagher, S. (2005) How the Body Shapes the Mind, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Gallagher, S. (in press) Relations between agency and ownership in the case of 
schizophrenic thought insertion and delusions of control, Review of Philosophy 
and Psychology. 
Garrett, M. & Silva, R. (2003) Auditory hallucinations, source monitoring, and the 
belief that ‘voices’ are real, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 29, pp. 445–457. 
Graham, G. (2004) Self-ascription: Thought insertion, in Radden, J. (ed.) The 
Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion, pp. 89–105, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
Hoerl, C. (2001) On thought insertion, Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 8, 
pp. 189–200. 
Hoffman, R.E. (1986) Verbal hallucinations and language production processes in 
schizophrenia, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, pp. 503–548. 
Horgan, T. & Tienson, J. (2002) The intentionality of phenomenology and the 
phenomenology of intentionality, in Chalmers, D.J. (ed.) Philosophy of Mind: 
Classical and Contemporary Readings, pp. 520–533, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Husserl, E. (1948/1973) Experience and Judgment, Churchill, J.S. & Ameriks, K. 
(trans.), London: Routledge. 
Jones, S.R. & Fernyhough, C. (2007) A new look at the neural diathesis-stress 
model of schizophrenia: The primacy of social-evaluative and uncontrollable 
situations, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 33, pp. 1171–1177. 
Kean, C. (2009) Silencing the self: Schizophrenia as a self-disturbance, Schizo-
phrenia Bulletin, 35, pp. 1034–1036. 
Kuipers, E., Garety, P., Fowler, D., Freeman, D., Dunn, G. & Bebbington, P. 
(2006) Cognitive, emotional, and social processes in psychosis: Refining cog-
nitive behavioral therapy for persistent positive symptoms, Schizophrenia 
Bulletin, 32 (S1), pp. 24–31. 
Langland-Hassan, P. (2008) Fractured phenomenologies: Thought insertion, inner 
speech, and the puzzle of extraneity, Mind & Language, 23, pp. 369–401. 
Larøi, F. (2006) The phenomenological diversity of hallucinations: Some 
theoretical and clinical implications, Psychologia Belgica, 46, pp. 163–183. 
Leudar, I, Thomas, P., McNally, D. & Glinski, A. (1997) What voices can do with 
words: Pragmatics of verbal hallucinations, Psychological Medicine, 27, pp. 
885–898. 
Madary, M. (2013) Anticipation and variation in visual content, Philosophical 
Studies, 165, pp. 335–347. 
McCarthy-Jones, S., Trauer, T., Mackinnin, A., Sims, E., Thomas, N. & Copolov, 
D.L. (2014) A new phenomenological survey of auditory hallucinations: 
Evidence for subtypes and implications for theory and practice, Schizophrenia 
Bulletin, 40, pp. 231–235. 
Mellor, C.H. (1970) First rank symptoms of schizophrenia, British Journal of 
Psychiatry, 117, pp. 15–23. 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
18
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
  THOUGHT  INSERTION  CLARIFIED 269 
Michie, P.T., Badcock, J.C., Waters, F.A.V. & Maybery, M.T. (2005) Auditory 
hallucinations: Failure to inhibit irrelevant memories, Cognitive Neuro-
psychiatry, 10, pp. 125–136. 
Moritz, S. & Larøi, F. (2008) Differences and similarities in the sensory and 
cognitive signatures of voice-hearing, intrusions and thoughts, Schizophrenia 
Research, 102, pp. 96–107. 
Nayani, T.H. & David, A.S. (1996) The auditory hallucination: A phenomeno-
logical survey, Psychological Medicine, 26, pp. 177–189. 
Noë, A. (2004) Action in Perception, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Paulik, G., Badcock, J.C. & Maybery, M.T. (2006) The multifactorial structure of 
the predisposition to hallucinate and associations with anxiety, depression and 
stress, Personality and Individual Differences, 41, pp. 1067–1076. 
Prinz, J. (2011) The sensory basis of cognitive phenomenology, in Bayne, T. & 
Montague, M. (eds.) Cognitive Phenomenology, pp. 174–196, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Raballo, A. & Larøi, F. (2011) Murmurs of thought: Phenomenology of halluci-
nating consciousness in impending psychosis, Psychosis, 3, pp. 163–166. 
Ratcliffe, M. (2008) Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense 
of Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ratcliffe, M. (2015) Experiences of Depression: A Study in Phenomenology, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ratcliffe, M. & Wilkinson, S. (in preparation) How anxiety induces verbal 
hallucinations. 
Roessler, J. (2013) Thought insertion, self-awareness, and rationality, in Fulford, 
K.W.M., Davies, M., Gipps, R.G.T., Graham, G., Sadler, J.Z., Stanghellini, G. 
& Thornton, T. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry, pp. 
658–672, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sass, L.A. (1992) Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of Modern Art, 
Literature and Thought, New York: Basic Books. 
Sass, L.A. (1994) The Paradoxes of Delusion: Wittgenstein, Schreber, and the 
Schizophrenic Mind, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Sechehaye, M. (1970) Autobiography of a Schizophrenic Girl, New York: Signet. 
Sousa, P. & Swiney, L. (2013) Thought insertion: Abnormal sense of thought 
agency or thought endorsement?, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 
12, pp. 637–654. 
Stephens, G.L. & Graham, G. (2000) When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien 
Voices and Inserted Thoughts, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Van den Berg, J.H. (1982) On hallucinating: Critical-historical overview and 
guidelines for further study, in de Koning, A.J.J. & Jenner, F.A. (eds.) Phenom-
enology and Psychiatry, pp. 97–110, London: Academic Press. 
Walker, E.F. & Diforio, D. (1997) Schizophrenia: A neural diathesis-stress model, 
Psychological Review, 104, pp. 667–685. 
Wu, W. (2012) Explaining schizophrenia: Auditory verbal hallucination and self-
monitoring, Mind & Language, 27, pp. 86–107. 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
18
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
